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Daniel Watts 
 
Whereof we cannot speak, thereof we have just 
contradicted ourselves. 
(Graham Priest) 
 
The ultimate can be reached only as limit. 
 (Søren Kierkegaard) 
 
Graham Priest’s Beyond the Limits of Thought (Priest 2001) parades an eclectic line-up of 
thinkers to show how the history of philosophy has been shaped by the spectre of paradoxes at the 
limits of thought. One name that is missing from Priest’s line-up is ‘Søren Kierkegaard’. This 
omission is something of a surprise, especially given Hegel’s centrality in the book and its (second-
edition) inclusion of Heidegger and Derrida. For, Kierkegaard’s writings are famous for nothing if 
not the way they involve such notions as ‘the absurd’, ‘the incomprehensible’ and ‘the Absolute 
Paradox’ and for their opposition to Hegelian ‘mediation’. But one can appreciate why an author 
might hesitate to venture something pithy about Kierkegaard on the limits of thought. For one 
thing, there is a real question whether we are supposed to take at all seriously talk of ‘the Absolute 
Paradox’ and the like in his enigmatic and often playful texts. And, as we shall see, the critics are so 
far from consensus in this regard as to associate Kierkegaard with nearly every imaginable view.   
I hope in this essay to help illuminate Kierkegaard’s place in the history of thinking about 
the limits of thought. I shall concentrate in the first instance on his treatment of the idea that 
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Christianity cannot be thought or understood. I shall begin by showing how this idea is ostensibly 
advanced by the pseudonymous work, Philosophical Fragments; and how this text positively courts the 
threat of self-referential incoherence in this connection. The threat is that, in advancing the view that 
Christianity lies beyond the limits of thought and understanding, Fragments relies on the very 
possibility it purports to rule out, viz. that Christianity can be thought and understood. Turning to 
the critics, I shall then consider two sorts of response to this threat and explain why I think we 
should be satisfied with neither. On a bullet-biting strategy, the putative argument of Philosophical 
Fragments is, and is intended to be, self-contradictory. On a relativizing strategy, by contrast, what 
Kierkegaard really wants to show is only that Christianity cannot be thought or understood relative to 
a certain point of view, viz. that of the outsider or unbeliever.  
In the second part of the essay (§§ II and III), my aim is to work towards a better response 
to the threat of self-stultification, both in the case of Fragments and more generally with respect to 
Kierkegaard’s view of the limits of thought. In my view, he crucially relies in this connection on a 
distinction between two kinds of thought and thinking: the aesthetic-intellectual and the ethico-religious. I 
shall argue that, on the basis of this distinction, we can explain both why Fragments draws attention 
to the threat of its own self-referential incoherence and how, from the logical point of view, this 
threat is nonetheless benign. 
It shall emerge that Kierkegaard holds a distinctive view of the limits of thought, not least 
against the background of the views of Kant and Hegel. Like Hegel, and expressly against ‘the 
Kantians’, Kierkegaard denies the coherence of any attempt to draw limits of thought by positing a 
division between two ontological realms, the thinkable and the unthinkable. But he equally rejects as 
illusory the purported Hegelian standpoint in which thought constitutively transcends its own limits, 
the standpoint of ‘pure thought’. Instead, Kierkegaard thinks we need to take up the kind of 
thinking he calls ‘existential’ or ‘ethico-religious’ thinking. On the interpretation I shall develop, it is 
3 
 
constitutive of such thinking to mark the limits of the ‘aesthetic-intellectual’, where this rubric 
encompasses any object of thought that is apt to sustain an attitude of disinterested contemplation. 
It is constitutive of ethico-religious thinking, that is, to delimit the domain of the aesthetic-
intellectual as such. We shall see that, for Kierkegaard, what lies beyond the limits of the aesthetic-
intellectual is not a realm of unthinkables, but rather the possibilities for human agency he associates 
with an individual’s ‘ethical actuality’.  
 
I. Philosophical Fragments and the Threat of Self-Stultification. 
 
Philosophical Fragments invites us to try an experiment, whether we can construct a system of 
thought that truly goes ‘beyond the Socratic’ (KW VII: 111).1 Oddly enough, Johannes Climacus, the 
book’s fictional author, declares himself at a loss to say what first moved him to come up with this 
project (KW VII: 9). But it does not take an aficionado of Danish Hegelianism circa 1843 to discern 
something of the polemical context here. For Climacus evidently finds among the intellectuals of his 
milieu a dubious readiness to take themselves to have indeed gone ‘beyond the Socratic’, by having 
finally brought to fulfilment not only the hitherto frustrated desires of philosophers in want of 
answers to Socratic questions, but also the insights dimly sensed in the religious beliefs and practices 
of ordinary folk, not least Christianity. Against this, Climacus seems to want to show that if anything 
can be truly said to go ‘beyond the Socratic’ it is Christianity; but that this is so only because 
Christianity stands in radical opposition to the very idea that human beings are capable of 
understanding the essential truth about themselves. The idea, so it seems, is to insist in an 
uncompromising way on the Pauline characterization of Christianity as ‘unto the Greeks foolishness’ 
(1 Corinthians 1: 23; cf. CUP: 179).     
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How, then, is Climacus’ thought-experiment supposed to show that Christianity stands 
opposed to the idea that human beings are capable of understanding themselves? On a natural first 
reading, his aim is to establish the following conditional, call it C:  
 
(C) If Christianity is true then essential truth lies beyond the limits of human understanding.  
 
‘Essential truth’ is the term Climacus introduces in his Postscript to Fragments, by way of a gloss on his 
references to ‘the Truth’ in the earlier work.2 In the first instance, it simply means the truth – 
whatever it is – about what it essentially means to be human, understood in broadly ethical terms; 
the truth about human excellence and flourishing. Now if C is true it is not obviously true. Many self-
identifying Christians would perhaps be inclined to dispute it. And it scarcely sits perfectly at ease 
with the venerable tradition of Christian natural theology and synthesis with Greek philosophy. 
Unquestionably, it flies in the face of Hegel’s account of the philosophical significance of 
Christianity; provided, that is, we do not assume some technical and restricted conception of ‘human 
understanding’. So we should ask how exactly Climacus’ thought-experiment is supposed to help 
establish this claim, C.  
In Chapter One, he begins by sketching out what he has in mind by ‘the Socratic’, 
elaborating a core hypothesis which can be summarized as follows: 
 
(A) Essential truth lies within the limits of human understanding. 
 
Telling a familiar story about the foundations of Western philosophy, Climacus presents Hypothesis 
A as underwriting a broadly ‘Socratic’ theoretical framework. It is said to underlie the theory of 
knowledge as recollection, for instance, as presented by Plato as a solution to the Meno Paradox. 
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And it is said to underlie a Socratic theory of philosophical education, as this is classically captured 
in Plato’s image of Socrates as the intellectual midwife who undermines illusions of knowledge and 
understanding in others so that, if possible, they can give birth to their own understanding. Indeed, 
Climacus invites us to think of Hypothesis A as a kind of framework assumption of the Western 
philosophical tradition as a whole.  
We may immediately note that, in Postscript, Climacus appears to place himself squarely 
within this ‘Socratic’ tradition, when he characterises his own outlook in terms of recollection.3 But 
we should notice too that, as he also makes a point of flagging up in Postscript, Climacus has already 
made a significant move just by choosing to represent ‘the Socratic’ in abstracto, as hypothesis and 
theory, a system of thought.4 
Having introduced Hypothesis A, Climacus is ready to frame his thought-experiment. What 
story, he asks, could we conceivably tell if we were to assume the antithesis of A? Namely, 
 
(B) Essential truth lies beyond the limits of human understanding. 
 
More precisely, we are to consider what story we could conceivably tell if we assume B and also that 
it is nonetheless possible for human beings to acquire knowledge of the Truth. Climacus officially 
has no interest in defending these suppositions. What he does purport to show is that, by applying 
certain procedures of negation and analogy, it turns out we can indeed imaginatively construct a 
system of thought that radically goes ‘beyond the Socratic’. Moreover, for each element of the 
mirror-image of the Socratic position he constructs, Climacus attaches a label that he teasingly steals 
from familiar Christian theology: God, faith, sin, the saviour, and so on. In short, the story that 
Climacus imaginatively conjures up in this way is that, due to sin, humans have lost the capacity to 
grasp the essential truth and so need to be recreated by God (a.k.a. ‘the unknown’) in order to 
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recover that capacity. He presents this story, more commonly known as Christianity, as flowing 
directly from the attempt to think up an alternative to the Socratic framework. 
According to what is ostensibly the argumentative core of Fragments, then, since we can as it 
were reinvent all the fundamental doctrines of Christianity merely by envisaging an antithetical 
theoretical framework to the Socratic, specified as such via simple operations of negation and 
analogy, it follows that Christianity implies B; and that is just to affirm C. What then are we to make 
of this argument strategy as such? 
We should be clear first of all that the argument is presented as wholly independent of 
whether or not either Hypothesis A or B is true. As he is careful to underscore in the ‘Moral’ at the 
end, Climacus’ dialectic has been purely hypothetical or subjunctive, as indeed befits a thought-
experiment. At several key junctures within Fragments, however, he points to a difficulty that goes to 
the heart of his experiment and threatens to dismantle his ostensible defence of C. The question is 
whether the story he has told, in the guise of a radical alternative to the Socratic, is conceivably true; 
that is, whether the truth of his elaboration of Hypothesis B can be so much as entertained. Despite 
the fact that his whole argument apparently rests on this possibility, and on the idea that what fits 
the bill is familiar to everyone as Christianity, Climacus strongly indicates that he thinks it is not 
possible after all.  
Thus, early on in his elaboration of Hypothesis B, he breaks off abruptly to ask whether his 
story is even ‘thinkable’ (KW VII: 20). Arrestingly, his answer appears to be in the negative. He says 
that, just as the unborn are obviously in no position to think about the transition from being unborn 
to being born, so, by its own lights, human beings are in no position to grasp the truth of the story 
he has been telling about rebirth. The reason is not hard to find. On the one hand, Hypothesis B, if 
it is true, is presumably an essential truth; it purports to state something about the essentially human. 
On the other hand, what it says is that essential truths are beyond the reach of human 
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understanding. Paradoxically, it seems the truth of Hypothesis B can be entertained only if it cannot 
be entertained – at least by any thinker who falls within the scope of ‘human understanding’. 
Climacus’ sharpest articulation of this problem, regarding the very thinkability of his story, 
comes in Chapter IV, ‘The Absolute Paradox: a Metaphysical Caprice’. Here, in Kantian vein, he 
attributes to the human understanding an internal dynamic of self-transcendence, such that, in its 
incessant desire to push back its own frontiers, it is ultimately driven to discover something it cannot 
understand – call it, ‘the unknown’. But Climacus is clear that any such desire ultimately stands only 
to be frustrated:    
 
Defined as the absolutely different, it [sc. ‘the unknown’] would appear to be on the way to 
being revealed, but this is not so, because absolute difference cannot even be thought; because 
the understanding cannot absolutely negate itself, but uses itself in order to do this …; it 
cannot go beyond itself absolutely and thus conceives this thing that transcends itself by 
means of itself (RPC: 45) 
 
In other words: it is self-defeating to try to conceive ‘the unknown’ even as that which radically 
transcends one’s understanding since, after all, this is itself a form of understanding. Again, the basic 
predicament that Climacus is making a meal of here is already implicit in the very attempt to state 
and elaborate Hypothesis B. For, suppose we write it this way: 
 
(B’) Essential truth – namely, that [….] – is beyond the reach of human understanding 
 
The trouble is that, as soon as we fill out the blank in B’, in any way we can understand, it seems we 
have already falsified the hypothesis. Quite generally, whenever we find a claim of the form ‘X is 
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unthinkable (or incommunicable, unrepresentable, inconceivable etc.)’ we immediately find this 
trouble; either, it appears, the claim is false, since it has managed to state something sensible about X 
after all, to represent it in an intelligible way, or the claim is nonsense, since it has not managed to 
say anything sensible about X nor to represent it in any intelligible way. In the gloss that Priest puts 
on predicaments of this sort, we have ‘a totality (of all things expressible, describable etc.) and an 
appropriate operation that generates an object that is both within and without the totality’ (Priest 
2001: 3). And when Climacus makes it out to be the result of his thought-experiment that 
Christianity is beyond the limits of human thought and understanding, the trouble is just the same.  
As we have seen, Climacus makes a point of flagging up this difficulty. And yet, so it seems, 
he blithely carries on with his thought-experiment, regardless. His expositors sometimes seem 
equally all too sanguine in this regard. It is suggested, for instance, that Kierkegaard’s goal is really 
just to remind readers, in a teasing sort of way, of what they already know about Christianity. As we 
have noted, however, C is controversial; especially against a background of Hegelian influence, it 
would be risky indeed to assume in the reader prior commitment to the thesis that the truth of 
Christianity is beyond the limits of human understanding. And although critics are right to observe 
that Kierkegaard sometimes uses the term ‘contradiction’ in a way that cannot mean a formal, logical 
contradiction, but denotes instead something like a co-presence of incongruent elements, it is not at 
all clear that this observation can help us here. For the worry is that Climacus winds up in 
straightforward self-contradiction: affirming at once that Christianity is beyond the limits of thought 
and that it is not.  
It therefore appears we need some way to disarm this threat of self-stultification. We need 
this, at least, if we are to keep in play the possibility that Fragments has any dialectical purchase 
against the (Hegelian) thought that, contra claim C, the insights implicit in Christian belief and 
practice can be translated into purely theoretical terms and harmonized with the philosophical 
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tradition. This is all the more so in the light of the fact that Hegel himself famously criticized Kant’s 
appeal to the phenomena / noumena distinction on the grounds that it is self-contradictory in just 
the way Climacus’ project threatens to be. Thus, Hegel: 
 
[I]t is the supreme inconsistency to admit, on the one hand, that the understanding is 
cognizant only of appearances, and to assert, on the other, that this cognition is something 
absolute – by saying: cognition cannot go any further, this is the natural, absolute restriction on 
human knowing …. Something is only known, or even felt, to be a restriction, or a defect, if 
one is at the same time beyond it. (EL: §60R, 105) 
 
Given his substantial agreement with Hegel that the understanding can, as Climacus puts it, 
transcend itself ‘only by means of itself’, one may well wonder what anti-Hegelian leverage he could 
intelligibly hope his thought-experiment to have. 
Two further points are worth noting before we proceed. First, the self-referential trouble 
that looms over Fragments is rather frequently in the offing in Kierkegaard. A representative example 
is already provided by the project he purports to take up in Part I of his magister dissertation: namely, 
to bring into view Socrates as a radical ‘ironist’, that is, as one who never appears as he really is. As 
Kierkegaard flags at the outset of The Concept of Irony, this project seems no less paradoxical than 
would be the attempt to ‘picture the nisse with the cap that makes him invisible’ (KW II: 12). 
(Virtually the same image – viz. painting Mars in the armour that makes him invisible – crops up 
more than once in Postscript (cf. CUP: fn. 67; 146).)  
Second, it is notable how the author of Fragments refuses standard ways of dealing with the 
threat of paradox at the limits of thought in theological contexts. The idea that God is beyond 
human understanding is of course far from being without precedent in the tradition of natural 
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theology. On the contrary, Anselm, Aquinas and others develop sophisticated strategies for 
expressing truths about God, notwithstanding His radical transcendence and alterity; not least, the 
so-called ways of analogy, negation and eminence. But Climacus flatly denies that the understanding 
can get any further at all in its effort to disclose ‘the unknown’ when it ‘risks a sortie via negationis or 
via eminentia’ (KW VII: 44). His reason, which applies no less to the way of analogy, is a simple 
dilemma: either these operations really do disclose the nature of something, in which case it does not 
radically transcend our understanding, or they disclose nothing, and we are, as Climacus says, no 
further.  
 
II. Two Interpretative Strategies: Bullet-Biting and Relativizing 
 
Can Fragments be rescued from self-referential incoherence? Turning to the critics, I want 
briefly to assess two sorts of response to this challenge: bullet-biting and relativizing. In fact, while there 
has been a great deal of discussion around Kierkegaard’s deployment of such terms as 
‘contradiction’, ‘the absurd’ and ‘the Absolute Paradox’ – whether these reveal him to be an 
irrationalist, suprarationalist, fideist, emotivist or what – it seems to me that the focus is too rarely 
on the bottom line regarding Fragments, from a critical point of view, i.e. whether its core argument is 
at all cogent. Accordingly, there will be an element of artificiality in my sketch of the existing 
strategies on offer. My aim here, however, is heuristic: to help bring out the difficulties surrounding 
the threat of self-stultification in Fragments and the need for a way forward.     
  To bite the bullet in this context would be to concede that Climacus’ project is self-
contradictory and to try to show that this is not the disaster it looks to be. Conceivably, one variant 
of this line would portray Kierkegaard as denying the law of non-contradiction, in something like the 
way Priest associates Hegel’s logic with the unorthodox doctrine that there are true contradictions at 
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the limits of thought. To be sure, a dialetheic reading of Kierkegaard (to indulge the anachronism) 
hardly seems promising given his well-attested opposition to what he (like Priest) regards as Hegel’s 
claim to have transcended the law of non-contradiction. Nonetheless, the impression that he 
knowingly endorses contradictions is no doubt behind Kierkegaard’s notoriety as an irrationalist and 
might lead to the idea that he believed there are true contradictions at the limits of thought. But the 
impression is certainly unsound; not least because, as C. Stephen Evans observes, the sense in which 
Climacus applies the term ‘contradiction’ to Christianity – or to the human self qua synthesis of 
opposing elements or to comic juxtapositions – is plainly not univocal with his use of the term 
when, as sometimes he does, he dismisses something on the grounds that it instantiates the form, p 
and ~p (Evans 1992: 97ff). (Critics of Priest’s take on Hegel will make parallel points about the 
latter’s distance from a merely propositional notion of contradiction.) 
But there is a more appealing way to bite the bullet. This is to argue that the real argument 
embodied by Fragments takes something like the form of the reductio and that this is quite intentionally 
reflected in the fact that Climacus’ project self-destructs. This strategy is consonant with the 
proposal, first advanced by Henry Allison (in Allison 1967), that the real project behind 
Kierkegaard’s Johannes Climacus literature is, in James Conant’s words, ‘an elaborate reductio ad 
absurdum of the philosophical project of clarifying and propounding what it is to be a Christian’ 
(Conant 1993: 207). On this approach, the underlying aim is said to be therapeutic: to wean the 
reader off any impulse he or she may feel to go in for the sorts of theorizing about Christianity that 
are being sent up.   
 The reductio reading has by now received a fair critical airing and this is not the place to 
review the arguments pro and contra.5 However, I do want to highlight one difficulty. Some complain 
that the approach foists on Kierkegaard an alien theory of nonsense, one that betrays origins in a 
contentious reading of Wittgenstein: the so-called ‘austere view’ (roughly: nonsense admits neither 
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of kinds nor degrees).6 A different misgiving, however, concerns the danger of reading back into 
Kierkegaard an alien conception of sense, and correlatively, of thought. Apropos the contrast between 
‘unintelligible though apparently intelligible chatter’ and ‘mere gibberish’, Conant wants to attribute 
to Kierkegaard the thesis that (as per the austere view) these two ‘differ only in their psychological 
import … Cognitively, they are equally vacuous’ (Conant 1989: 249, my emphasis). Accordingly, we 
are to take it that Climacus’ core presentation of Christianity is intended to carry no ‘cognitive’ 
significance whatsoever, but only ‘psychological import’ and therapeutic effect. Now, a sharp 
cognition / psychology contrast of this sort is one we might more naturally associate with Frege; one 
thinks for instance of his characterization of logic and mathematics in terms of ‘the investigation of 
mind; of the mind, not of minds’ (Frege 1977 [1918]: 25). So is there anything in Kierkegaard akin to 
Frege’s view of the autonomy of the logical vis-à-vis the psychological, along with associated 
oppositions between Thoughts and ideas, the semantic and the rhetorical, the mind and mere minds?  
  The evidence points, rather, to Kierkegaard’s insistence on thought’s situatedness in human 
psychology and interests. In his journals, for instance, he remarks that the trouble with ‘modern 
theorizers’ is that ‘they entirely forget that the thinker himself is of course like the flautist’s 
instrument and that it is therefore of the greatest importance to know one’s instrument’ – adding, 
parenthetically, that ‘this is where psychology is situated’ (KJN II: 233). And it is a recurring theme in 
his writings that thinkers’ pre-reflective agency is ineliminable from even the most abstract, 
systematic kinds of judgement. Thus, in Postscript, as part of his stinging critique of Hegel’s 
conception of ‘pure thought’, Climacus argues that logical systems cannot ultimately be severed 
from the non-discursive performances of particular human thinkers, and rounds out his discussion 
with the remark that ‘to shed light on logic, it might be a good thing to place oneself psychologically 
in the state of mind of someone who thinks the logical’ (CUP: 99).7 I do not think any of this 
expresses what Frege knew as psychologism. But it does raise a question about any approach to 
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Kierkegaard in the spirit of Frege's sharp contrasts between thoughts and ideas, the logical and the 
psychological. We should at any rate ask whether, in order to deal with the threat of self-
stultification, we need so extreme a claim as that Climacus’ so-called ‘thought-project’ is deliberately 
vacuous, intentionally devoid of ‘cognitive’ content.  
In this light, we may be tempted by a rival to bullet-biting that lies more in the mainstream 
of Kierkegaard studies: relativizing. The idea here is that, inasmuch as Climacus seems to run up 
against limits of thought, these limits are really to be understood as relative to a point of view, 
namely that of the outsider or unbeliever. Kierkegaard’s aim, in other words, is to identify the de facto 
limitations of a certain perspective or form of life, not the de jure limits of human thought as such. 
On a standard variant of this line, he means to portray Climacus, qua Socratic thinker and humourist, 
as an outsider’s perspective on Christianity, precisely in order to show that, from this (albeit religious) 
perspective, Christianity cannot but appear absurd and incomprehensible.  
     Relativizers face two challenges. First, they need to make sense of Kierkegaard’s 
commitment to the possibility of a lucid rejection of Christianity. For, if Christianity is literally 
unintelligible to outsiders, such rejection surely cannot be possible. Kierkegaard, however, will dryly 
remark that Christianity’s opponents have for a long time been ‘the only ones from whom it has 
been possible to get any trustworthy information about what Christianity is’ (JP III: 3337). And it is 
most likely to Feuerbach, in particular, that Climacus refers as one who ‘attacks Christianity and at 
the same time expounds it so creditably that … a person who has difficulties in presenting 
Christianity properly and definitely is almost compelled to resort to him’ (KW XII: 614). Secondly, 
friends of relativizing need to make it plausible that, despite many appearances to the contrary, 
Kierkegaard thinks the believer is able to transcend the perspective from which Christianity appears 
paradoxical and incapable of being understood.  
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A standard move here is to appeal to the idea that understanding admits of degrees. Whereas 
the outsider is in a position to understand Christianity to a very low degree, and will assign a 
correspondingly low probability to its being true, the believer is able to understand Christianity to a 
higher degree, even if not perfectly. Thus, Evans claims that the limitations on Climacus’ own 
perspective are, in Kierkegaard’s view, capable of being ‘partially overcome’ by the believer (Evans 
2008: 1023, my emphasis). Likewise, in his response to Conant, John Lippitt appeals to the idea that 
Christianity only appears to be (more-or-less) nonsensical to the on-looker; the believer, on the other 
hand, is able to make some sense out of it, even if not full sense, ‘in and through’ the living out of a 
Christian life (Lippitt & Hutto 1998: 288).  
Suppose, then, that what Kierkegaard really wants to show is that Christianity can only 
appear highly improbable, from the perspective of the outsider. The trouble is, in that case, the core 
argument of Fragments seems spectacularly ill-suited to deliver the right conclusion, since it makes 
Christianity out to be the very antithesis of the supposition that the truth is within the reach of 
human understanding. So the dilemma for views like Evans’ and Lippitt’s is this: either the way the 
believer is able to ‘make some sense’ of Christianity entails that, after all, Christianity lies within the 
limits of human understanding, in which case we lose the contrast with the Socratic hypothesis (A) 
and Climacus’ thought-project collapses; or the way in which the believer is able to ‘make some 
sense’ of Christianity is compatible with the hypothesis (B) that Christianity lies beyond the limits of 
human understanding, in which case the threat of self-referential incoherence remains. On either 
horn of this dilemma, Fragments does not emerge as a work that withstands much scrutiny. 
 None of this is to deny that there is much of value both in interpretations that emphasize 
the mimetic, satirical, character of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings and also in interpretations 
that distinguish between relating to religious concepts in a merely external and intellectual way and 
trying to appropriate such concepts in one’s life. My aim in the rest of this essay, however, is to work 
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towards an alternative to both the bullet-biting and relativizing responses to the threat of self-
stultification. This alternative crucially relies on a distinction between two kinds of thinking, to 
which I now turn. 
 
III. Two kinds of thinking: aesthetic-intellectual and ethico-religious 
 
A returning theme in Kierkegaard’s writings, including those whose authorship he was 
prepared to own, can be summarized as the idea that some things resist aesthetic-intellectual 
representation. A mode of representation is ‘aesthetic-intellectual’, in the relevant sense, just in case 
it is apt to sustain an attitude of disinterested contemplation.8 Accordingly, the category potentially 
encompasses things as diverse as a poem, a treatise, a table of data and a system of symbolic logic. 
‘Disinterestedness’ is not to be confused here with emotional detachment or one’s being 
uninterested. The contrast, rather, is with the idea of an active, concrete interest in one’s own 
existence as such.9 But the significance for Kierkegaard of the idea of a category of representations 
that sustain disinterestedness emerges in the light of the way he presents certain things as such as to 
resist being so represented. Admittedly, the list of things he presents as satisfying this condition itself 
hardly looks homogenous. This list plausibly includes, inter alia: the lives of Abraham, Socrates and 
Christ; the phenomena of faith, freedom and sin; others qua moral exemplars and oneself qua 
synthesis of opposing elements; and death. But let us briefly consider the case of death. 
Early on in his discourse, ‘At a Graveside’, Kierkegaard remarks that there is a sense in 
which death is ‘not something actual’ (KW X: 74). He means that if our thoughts in the vicinity of 
death are directed only towards the actual deaths of others around us, and the circumstances around 
these events, then there is a sense in which we will only seem to be thinking about death and we will 
miss what death essentially has to teach us. This, he argues, is because there is a sense in which you 
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are thinking in earnest about death only if you are (inter alia) thinking your own death; but you cannot 
conceive your own death so long as you are thinking of death merely as an actual event since, as 
Epicurus observed, when it is, you are not. We shall come shortly to the general considerations 
behind Kierkegaard’s view that thinking in earnest about death per se must involve thinking about 
one’s own death in particular. But we should first be clear about the conclusion he draws, viz. that in 
the sense in which death is ‘not something actual’ – the sense in which it eludes any thinking that is 
only about actual events – death resists our familiar ways of trying to represent it. Specifically, 
Kierkegaard seeks to show how death resists being represented as a restful sleep, for example, or as 
a way out, or as the culmination of one’s life story. The earnest thought of death, as he puts the 
general point, ‘does not sit sunk in contemplation, does not rewrite expressions, does not think 
about the ingeniousness of imagery, does not discuss’ (KW X: 82-83).    
What is it about imagery, written descriptions and the like that makes these ill-suited to 
convey the earnest thought of death? The clue is in the phrase, just quoted, about one’s being ‘sunk 
in contemplation’. The point is: images and written expressions are typically the sorts of things that 
can sustain an attitude of disinterested contemplation, as exhibited, for example, in a mood of 
‘absentminded preoccupation with the symbols of death’ (KW X: 84). The earnest thought of death, 
by contrast, cannot. Again, we should not confuse ‘absentminded preoccupation’ here with 
emotional detachment: one’s susceptibility to brood on the image of death as a way out, for 
example, may indeed be deeply emotionally engaged, moved by sorrow or depression, and yet, 
Kierkegaard insists, no less for that a failure to think in earnest about death.  
 Now, we may not assume that, in Kierkegaard’s view, it follows from the fact that X defies 
aesthetic-intellectual representation that X cannot be thought or represented simpliciter. For he may 
think X can be represented in some other way. Indeed, in ‘At a Graveside’, he makes it clear he 
thinks death can be thought and represented, despite its ‘singularity’ and ‘indefinability’. Indeed, he 
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goes so far as to define earnestness about death in terms of the inwardness of thought, as opposed to 
the externality of ‘mood’, as the means by which ‘the external is ennobled in one’s consciousness’ 
(KW X: 74). And the discourse makes liberal use of such locutions as ‘think[ing] death’, ‘thinking 
about [one’s] own death’, and ‘the earnest thought of death’ (KW X: 75, 77, 85). So it would make 
little sense to suppose that, when he portrays death as such as to elude the grasp of any symbol that 
can sustain ‘absent-minded preoccupation’, Kierkegaard means to say that death is unthinkable, 
period. 
Likewise, it is clear that Climacus, for his part, does not regard the aesthetic-intellectual as 
the only mode of representation and thought. On the contrary, in Postscript he argues for the need to 
recognize a different kind of representation and thinking. This is the thinking he now associates 
most of all with Socrates; and in a way that, as he himself indicates, stands in some tension with his 
original presentation of ‘the Socratic’ in abstracto, as a theoretical system.10 Indeed, Climacus’ 
discussion of the style of thinking he variously qualifies in Postscript as ‘negative’, ‘indirect’, 
‘existential’, ‘subjective’, ‘doubly reflected’ and ‘ethico-religious’ notably echoes Kierkegaard’s 
account, in his magister dissertation, of the distinctive way of thinking he finds exemplified by 
Socrates (and missing in Hegel’s depiction of Socrates as a would-be systematic philosopher).11 
Climacus wants to show that ‘ethico-religious’ thinking, of the kind exemplified by Socrates, 
properly belongs to questions of essential truth, that is, to questions pertaining to what it means to 
be human and how one should live.   
What, then, is ethico-religious thinking? And how does its mode of representation differ 
from the aesthetic-intellectual? The answer, I submit, is that it is constitutive of ethico-religious 
thinking to represent certain things precisely as such as to resist aesthetic-intellectual representation. 
It is part and parcel of such thinking to represent death, for example, as resisting any image or 
expression or symbol that is apt to sustain disinterested contemplation. If this answer is going to be 
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convincing, however, we need to know why ethico-religious thinking is supposed in general to have 
this singular shape. After all, many philosophers evidently take it that questions about human 
flourishing call for nothing more quixotic than common-or-garden thinking and deliberation about 
the relevant topics: the nature of virtue, its relationship to happiness, whether death is a harm, 
whether belief in God is rational and so forth. So we might press the question: why are ‘existential’ 
issues supposed to call for anything especially out of the ordinary in the way of thinking? 
Postscript can be seen, in fact, to offer a detailed rationale for the notion of a kind of thinking 
that is constitutively ‘negative’ or delimiting. Climacus’ reasoning is based on two core premises: (i) 
the essentially human cannot be thought about in a merely abstract way; in this arena, one’s thinking 
must also be concrete; and (ii) trying to think in the appropriately concrete way in this domain must 
involve trying to delimit the proper domain of disinterested contemplation as such. On this basis, 
Climacus maintains that part and parcel of what it is truly to think about the essentially human – as 
opposed to one’s merely seeming so to be thinking – is to represent certain things as such as to 
resist aesthetic-intellectual representation. Let me then briefly unpack these two claims.  
Firstly, Climacus insists that not all thought is abstract. On the contrary, there is a kind of 
thinking that is properly called ‘concrete’: 
 
What is concrete thinking? It is thought where there is also one who thinks, and a definite 
something (in the sense of ‘particular’) that is thought, where existence gives the existing 
thinker thought, time and space. (CUP: 279) 
 
His appeal to the distinction between abstract and concrete thinking is no doubt bound up with 
Climacus’ attack on Hegel’s ‘pure thought’. But the distinction itself is straightforward enough. It is 
the contrast between thinking about a thought or proposition, as when I think about the thought that 
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just crossed my mind, and directly thinking of or about some particular thing as thus-and-so, as 
when I think of a particular person as a friend or of a particular rock as resistant to my will. The 
contrast, as we might put it, is between reflexive, de dicto thought, in which propositional contents are 
in turn the objects of thoughts, and first-order, de re thought, where the expression ‘thinking a 
thought’ is a mere cognate accusative. Climacus’ first premise, then, is that thinking about the 
essentially human must be concrete in just this sense. (The converse does not hold: not all concrete 
thinking is about the essentially human.) That is, ethico-religious thinking must involve, inter alia, 
thinking of or about your own individual existence in concreto, as one for whom the issue of what you 
are – or, rather, who you are becoming – is inescapable. Each must mind his or her own ‘ethical 
actuality’, as Climacus will say. 
 Lest we lose track of the sense in which we are still talking here about a kind of thinking, 
however, and not something in the order of a brute awareness of one’s own existence, we must be 
clear that Climacus in no wise denies that ethico-religious thinking also involves reflection and 
abstract inquiry. On the contrary, the notion of ‘double reflection’ – one of his few terms of art – is 
plainly intended to encapsulate the idea that what we need is a kind of thinking that is both abstract 
and concrete:  
 
The reflection of inwardness is the subjective thinker’s double-reflection. In thinking, he 
thinks the universal, but as existing in this thinking, as assimilating this in his inwardness, he 
becomes more and more subjectively isolated. (CUP: 62) 
 
Again, it is first and foremost to Socrates that we are to look for a model here, in his singular ability 
to pursue abstract ti esti questions regarding the universally human, while continually ‘leaping aside’ 
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to return to the concrete matter how he himself stands in relation to the questions at issue (cf. KW 
II: 166).12 
If doubly-reflected thought and inquiry is the aim, Climacus is nonetheless alive to a danger 
that threatens its practical possibility. The worry is that, despite your best efforts to think through 
‘the universally human’ as applied to your own case, you might still fail to think of or about yourself, 
in propria persona and in concreto. For example, it is possible to apply to oneself the thought that all 
humans are mortal in a way that remains wholly disinterested and abstract (‘all men are mortal, D.W. 
is a man …’). And it is a familiar observation that one can come to know something about oneself in 
a purely explanatory and third-personal way, without this entering into one’s reflexive self-
awareness.13 Moreover, Climacus evidently fears that we moderns are more than ever in danger of 
losing track of ourselves in this way, of becoming transfixed in the moment of ‘first reflection’, 
mesmerized by the seductive image or the striking idea. Hence, his insistence on our need for a kind 
of thinking that is distinctively ‘negative’ or delimiting; the need for the kind of reflection on the 
universally human that always has an eye to the limits of disinterested contemplation; the need to 
counteract the tendency for such contemplation to swallow up any concrete interest that may have 
spurred one to take up a given question in the first place.14 To amplify the obvious echoes here of 
Kant’s conception of transcendental philosophy: the task is to make room for one’s ‘ethical actuality’ 
by delimiting the sphere of the aesthetic-intellectual. 
Kant has his phenomena / noumena distinction. But the question remains how Kierkegaard, 
for his part, thinks the limits of the aesthetic-intellectual are to be made out. It is here, I submit, that 
Climacus’ view of ethico-religious thinking connects up with the idea that some things defy 
aesthetic-intellectual representation. The idea that ethico-religious thinking is constitutively 
delimiting, that is, implies a certain contrast with the natural assumption that thought about the 
essentially human can be specified merely by reference to some set of relevant concepts: virtue, well-
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being, happiness and the like. In the contrasting view I think we may attribute to Kierkegaard, it 
belongs to thinking about the essentially human to take as its objects things that satisfy two 
conditions: they are (A) apt to challenge our understanding of what it essentially means to be human, 
in ways that (B) cannot sustain disinterested contemplation.  
Plausibly, these conditions, A and B, need to be regarded as independent and 
complementary. One reason is that not everything that defies aesthetic-intellectual representation is 
also apt to challenge our self-understanding. If Mein Kampf thwarts the attempts of intellectual 
historians to represent its discursive content, for example, it does not follow that Hitler’s book 
properly challenges us to rethink our understanding of the essentially human. This raises the issue of 
how we are to tell apart the things that satisfy condition A as well as B. While his works may help us 
to make such judgments in particular cases, I believe we will look in vain to Kierkegaard for general 
criteria. Every indication is that he thought no such criteria can be given. In The Concept of Irony, for 
instance, he likens Socrates’ uncanny ability to hunt down the genuinely aporetic to a divining rod 
that ‘wishes only where there is water’ (KW II: 35n). Contra those who deny the possibility in 
principle of a contrast between objective aporiai and nonsense, however, the idea that some things 
do indeed satisfy both A and B is at the heart of Kierkegaard’s distinctive conception of paradox. As 
he reflects in an early journal entry: 
 
The paradox is the authentic pathos of the intellectual life, and just as only great souls are 
susceptible to passions, so are only great thinkers susceptible to what I call paradoxes, which 
are nothing other than grandiose thoughts, not yet fully developed. (KJN II: 95) 
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In this view, there is a world of difference between the merely incoherent and the pregnant thought 
that wants completion. But the ability to discern the one from the other is ultimately down to the 
sensitivity of the thinker’s pathos and judgement. 
According to Kierkegaard’s idea, then, some things – death, for example – challenge us to 
rethink what it means to be human, but in ways that defy aesthetic-intellectual representation; and it 
belongs to ethico-religious thinking to represent these things as such. On the interpretation of 
Fragments I want to advance, this is just what Climacus’ thought-experiment is designed to achieve 
vis-à-vis Christianity, i. e. to represent Christianity as challenging our understanding of what it means 
to be human in ways that defy aesthetic-intellectual representation. Of course, if Climacus’ project is 
not to be consigned to self-stultification after all, we still need to ease the worry that his portrayal of 
Christianity itself falls under the rubric of the aesthetic-intellectual. First, however, let me draw out 
two key implications of his account of ethico-religious thinking vis-à-vis the limits of thought, by 
way of a twofold comparison with Kant. 
Firstly, Kierkegaard’s view does not posit any entities that lie beyond the limits of thought or 
understanding. This marks a contrast with Kant, on a traditional (and tenacious) ‘two-worlds’ 
reading of his appeal to the phenomena / noumena distinction. Kierkegaard’s view, that is, does not 
imply two sorts of entities or ontic realms, the thinkable and the unthinkable. Rather, it relies on the 
idea of two spheres of human agency: viz. the aesthetic-intellectual and the ethico-religious. Genuine 
thinking about the essentially human, on this account, involves as it were keeping watch over the 
boundary between the two spheres; making room for the ethico-religious by delimiting the aesthetic-
intellectual.15 Kierkegaard expressly takes issue with the Kantians in this regard: 
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The Kantian discussion of an an sich which thought cannot get hold of is a misunderstanding 
occasioned by bringing actuality into relationship with thought. But to conquer this 
misunderstanding with the help of pure thought is a chimeric victory. (JP II: 2235) 
 
The chimeric victory is of course Hegel’s. On Kierkegaard’s diagnosis, Hegel quite rightly exposes 
the self-referential incoherence of the Kantians’ conception of the limits of thought; but, by trying to 
ascent to an illusory realm of ‘pure thought’, Hegel signally fails to draw the right moral, viz. that, as 
Climacus puts it, we must resist the temptation to think in terms of a ‘self-withholding an sich … 
instead of referring actuality to the ethical’ (CUP: 275, my emphasis). What this means, I take it, is that we 
should resist any temptation to posit a realm of unthinkable things – McDowell’s ‘ineffable in itself’ 
– but think instead in terms of a modality or ‘sphere’ of human comportment, the first-personal 
sphere of an individual’s ‘ethical actuality’ (cf. McDowell 1998: 180). 
We should also recognize, however, the way Kierkegaard positively appropriates Kant’s 
contrast between a limitation and a limit or boundary. In the Prolegomena, Kant argues that, by 
contrast with the merely negative notion of a limitation – as in e. g. the limited capacity of a 
container – a boundary has a positive character by virtue of sharing features both with entities within 
the domain it bounds and also with what lies beyond. So conceived, a boundary, as opposed to a 
limitation, is a limiting case. (Kant’s example: ‘a point is the boundary of a line, yet is nonetheless a 
locus in space’ (Kant 2004: 105).) Dolors Vidal rightly notes the connection here, apropos 
Kierkegaard’s remark that ‘human reason has boundaries; that is where the negative concepts are to 
be found’ (JP I: 7): 
 
It is not surprising that Kierkegaard conceives of ‘negative concepts’ in the same way as Kant 
conceived of the limit, namely as boundaries, since Kierkegaardian negative concepts seem to 
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enjoy the same dialectic of limit; in negatively demarcating their borders they also show what 
is beyond them. (Vidal 2005: 455) 
 
Vidal goes on to specify ‘the positive sense’ of the limit, on the view Kierkegaard shares with Kant, 
in terms of an ‘opening towards a forever unknown beyond’ (idem). This formulation, however, 
seems only to bring us back to the metaphysics of ‘the self-withholding an sich’. We do better justice 
to the way he critically appropriates Kant’s sense of the positive character of a limit, I suggest, if we 
attribute to Kierkegaard the view that, by challenging our self-understanding in ways that cannot 
sustain disinterested contemplation, some things are apt not only to delimit the aesthetic-intellectual 
as such but further, and positively, to open us towards our own ethical actuality. For Kierkegaard, 
the objects of thought that can serve to play this role for us evidently include death – but also the 
life of Socrates, for example, or Christ.  
 
IV. Christianity, Caricatures and the Coherence of Fragments 
 
With these pieces in place, let us finally return to the threat of self-stultification in Fragments. 
In outline, the predicament in which we left Climacus’ thought-experiment was this: 
 
1. It is possible, via procedures of negation and analogy, to represent a system of thought on 
the hypothesis that essential truth lies beyond the limits of our understanding. 
2. To represent a system of thought that radically goes ‘beyond the Socratic’ in this way is to 
represent Christianity. 
So (C1), Christianity is suitably represented as a system of thought that, if true, lies beyond the 
limits of our understanding. 
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3. If (for some F) X is suitably represented as F then X lies within the limits of our 
understanding  
4. Christianity can be suitably represented (from C1) 
So (C2), Christianity is not suitably represented as a system of thought that, if true, lies beyond 
the limits of our understanding (from 3 and 4) 
 
Given that C1 and C2 are plainly contradictory – in a robustly logical sense – and given that 
Climacus is committed to Premises 1-3, it seems we must conclude that (on anything but a dialetheic 
reading) Fragments is incoherent and self-stultifying, hopelessly embroiled in trying to tell an 
untellable tale.  
Climacus’ recognition of the force of Premise 3 is manifest in those passages in which, as we 
saw, he renders questionable whether the truth of his non-Socratic story can so much as be 
entertained. But we are now in a position to properly register the possibility of an alternative to the 
choice between bullet-biting and relativizing: call it disambiguating. Suppose then that, rather than the 
conjunction C1 and C2, we should instead construe the intended upshot of Climacus’ thought-
experiment thus: 
 
(C*) Christianity is suitably represented in an ethico-religious way as incapable of being suitably 
represented in an aesthetic-intellectual way.  
 
The formal possibility of a disambiguating solution of this sort ought to be clear. If someone says ‘X 
cannot be represented, simpliciter’, we immediately have trouble: it appears their statement is either 
false or nonsensical. But if someone were to say, ‘X cannot be represented; that is, apart from the 
way I have just represented it’ then obviously this reflexive trouble would not arise. The new trouble 
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of course is that to just plead an exception for one’s own sayings about the unsayable would appear 
thoroughly unsatisfactory and ad hoc. Such special pleading would appear to undermine the whole 
force of the claim that something is unsayable or unthinkable in the first place. As we have seen, 
however, the idea of a distinct kind of thinking that is constitutively delimiting vis-à-vis the aesthetic-
intellectual has an independent motivation in Kierkegaard’s thought. For this reason, I think we 
should take seriously the possibility that Climacus can perfectly well make an exception for his own 
representation of Christianity, when he portrays Christianity as resisting representation, without at all 
blunting its force. 
 If disambiguating is to be convincing, we need to be assured on two points. First, we need to 
be assured that Climacus’ own portrayal of Christianity, as the mirror-image of the Socratic, is not 
itself in the aesthetic-intellectual mode, at least according to its design. This amounts to the question 
whether Climacus’ own mode of representation is apt to sustain disinterested contemplation. For, if 
it is, disambiguating obviously fails. Second, we need to be assured that Climacus’ portrayal of 
Christianity does get something importantly right about its subject-matter. For, if it does not, it 
cannot with any plausibility be taken to show specifically how Christianity challenges our self-
understanding in ways that cannot sustain disinterested contemplation; and again our proposed 
solution fails. Finally, then, let me briefly address these two points in turn. 
 Is Fragments, and the thought-experiment at its core, apt to sustain an attitude of disinterested 
contemplation? There is every reason to think not, at least according to its design. Consider the 
following commentary on the work by its author, from a footnote in Postscript that has been much 
emphasized by bullet-biters in the tradition of Allison: 
 
The clash of form, the experiment’s teasing resistance to the content, the poetic cheek (which 
even invents Christianity), the only attempt made to go further, that is beyond the so-called 
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speculative construction, the tirelessly active irony; the parody of speculation in the entire plan 
… [M]y distinctive procedure … lies first and foremost in the clashing form. (CUP: 230-
231fn) 
 
I take it that what Climacus means here by ‘the clash of form’ and ‘the experiment’s teasing 
resistance to the content’ is just what I have been calling the threat of self-stultification: viz. the way 
that, according to its content, Fragments makes Christianity out to lie beyond the limits of thought 
while at the same time, according to its form, making Christianity out to be readily intelligible by 
means of simple operations of negation and analogy. Moreover, it is precisely this ‘clash of form’ 
that is evidently designed to block a disinterested reading of the book. As is evidenced by the 
German reviewer that Climacus complains about in the footnote from which I have just cited, there 
can be no guarantee that a given reader of Fragments will not stubbornly try to read it as though it 
were a straightforward treatise, or get carried away by its didactic import or dialectical prowess; but 
its author can hardly be blamed for that.  
 We can therefore see why the threat of self-stultification, though logically benign, is integral 
to the design of Fragments, as grounded in Climacus’ aim to do all he can to obstruct any reception of 
his book in a spirit of disinterested contemplation. But in what sense, then, is Fragments’ portrait of a 
radical alternative to ‘the Socratic’ supposed to be faithful to Christianity? A full answer would 
require close scrutiny of each detail of this portrait, which I shall not attempt here. But I do want to 
suggest the general shape of an answer. Suppose, then, we take seriously the idea that something like 
Christianity can be conjured up, through operations of negation and analogy, in the way Climacus 
does it in Fragments. The question is: in what sense like?  
One of the books we know Kierkegaard read closely was Henrik Steffens’ Caricatures of the 
Most Holy.16 Steffens’ title, not least, evidently struck a chord. Thus, in a journal, Kierkegaard remarks 
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that the dramatis personae of his restaging of Plato’s Symposium, ‘In Vino Veritas’, are each in different 
ways ‘caricatures of the most holy’ (JP V: 5755). My suggestion is that Climacus’ thought-experiment 
is likewise intended to produce a caricature of Christianity, where the art of caricature is a sort of 
limiting case of aesthetic-intellectual representation.17 For consider in general the art of caricature. At 
first blush, the trick is to distort the subject enough to achieve a comic effect but not so much as to 
render the content unrecognisable as a depiction of the subject; indeed, in such a way that salient 
features are revealed. A caricature sets up a fruitful tension between its form (how it depicts) and its 
content (that and what it depicts). As Climacus himself puts it: 
 
Caricature is comic. How? Through the contradiction between likeness and unlikeness. The 
caricature must resemble a person, in fact an actual, particular person. If it does not, it is not 
comic but a straightforward exercise in meaningless fantasy. (CUP: 433n) 
 
In similarly paradoxical vein, Stephanie Ross writes that a caricature ‘effects easy identification 
through false description’ (Ross 1974: 286).18 Unlike realistic portraits, which are self-effacing in 
relation to what they depict, caricatures make play of their status as pictures. On the other hand, 
unlike mechanical distortions such as a fish-eye photograph, caricatures are purposefully distorted, 
as Ross puts it, ‘so as to give a new insight into, a new vision of, the face’ (Ross 1974: 290). 
Something similar, I submit, is true of the depiction of Christianity we find in Fragments; a depiction 
which, after all, is drawn by a self-styled humourist.  
One might still press the question: if, as I have argued, his underlying aim is to show that 
Christianity challenges our self-understanding in ways that cannot sustain disinterested 
contemplation, why does Kierkegaard not just argue for this, clearly and explicitly? Postscript comes 
quite close to such explicitness. But the reason surely has to do with his aim, not just to state truths 
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about the sort of challenge with which Christianity confronts us, but to make this challenge come 
alive for his readers as one that opens us to our ethical actuality. In this regard, no doubt, the work 
must speak for itself.19   
  
References 
Allison, H. E. (1967), ‘Christianity and Nonsense’, Review of Metaphysics 20: 432-60. 
Evans, C. S. (1997), Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
––––– (2008), ‘Kierkegaard and the Limits of Reason: Can There Be a Responsible Fideism?’ Revista 
Portuguesa de Filosofia 64: 1021-1035. 
Burgess, A. (2009), ‘Henrich Steffens: Combining Danish Romanticism with Christian Orthodoxy’ 
in J. Stewart (eds.), Kierkegaard and his Danish Contemporaries, Tome I. Farnham: Ashgate. 
Conant, J. (1989), ‘Must We Show What We Cannot Say?’, in R. Fleming and M. Payne (eds.), The 
Senses of Stanley Cavell. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press. 
––––– (1993), ‘Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and Nonsense’, in T. Cohen, P. Guyer & H. Putnam 
(eds.), Pursuits of Reason. Texas: Texas University Press. 
Ferreira, M. J. (1994), ‘The Point Outside the World: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein on Nonsense, 
Paradox and Religion’ Religious Studies 30: 29-44. 
Frege, G. (1977) [1918], ‘Thoughts’, in his Logical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Hannay, A. (2003), ‘Climacus among the Philosophers’, in Kierkegaard and Philosophy: Selected Essays. 
London: Routledge. 
Hopkins, R (1998), Picture, Image and Experience: A Philosophical Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kant, I. (2004), Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. G. Hatfield. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lippitt, J. & Hutto, D. (1998), ‘Making Sense of Nonsense: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein’ Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society 98: 263-86. 
McDowell, J. (1998), ‘Two Sorts of Naturalism’, in his Mind, Value, and Reality. London: Harvard 
University Press.  
Moran, R. (2001), Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 
30 
 
Mulhall, S. (1999), ‘God’s Plagiarist: The Philosophical Fragments of Johannes Climacus’ Philosophical 
Investigations 22: 1-34. 
––––– (2001), Inheritance and Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Priest, G. (2001), Beyond the Limits of Thought. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Ross, S. (1974), ‘Caricature’ The Monist 58: 285-293. 
Rubenstein, M.-J. (2002), ‘Ecstatic Subjectivity: Kierkegaard’s Critiques and Appropriations of the 
Socratic’, Modern Theology 17: 442-73. 
Rudd, A. (2000), ‘On Straight and Crooked Readings: Why the Postscript Does Not Self-Destruct’, in 
P. Houe, G. D. Marino & S. H. Rossel (eds.), Anthropology and Authority: Essays on Søren 
Kierkegaard. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi. 
Schönbaumsfeld, G. (2007), A Confusion of the Spheres: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein on Philosophy and 
Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Vidal, D. (2005), ‘The Pathos of Limit: Reading Kierkegaard Through the Dialectic of Limit’, in 
Cappelørn & H. Deuser (eds.), Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook: 2005. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.  
Watts, D. (2007), ‘The Paradox of Beginning: Hegel, Kierkegaard and Philosophical Inquiry’ Inquiry 
50: 5-33. 
––––– (2010), ‘Subjective Thinking: Kierkegaard on Hegel’s Socrates’ Hegel Bulletin 61: 23-44.  
––––– (2013), ‘Kierkegaard and the Search for Self-Knowledge’ European Journal of Philosophy 21: 525-
549. 
Weston, M. (1999), ‘Evading the Issue: The Strategy of Kierkegaard’s Postscript’ Philosophical 
Investigations 22: 35-64. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Abbreviations used:  
KW = Kierkegaard’s Writings, ed. and trans. H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong et al., 26 volumes (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1978-2000). 
JP = Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, trans. H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong, 7 volumes (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1967-78). 
KJN = Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks, trans. N. J. Cappelørn, A. Hannay, B. Kirmmse et. al., 8 
volumes (Princeton: Princeton University Press.) 
RPC = Kierkegaard, Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs, trans. M. G. Piety (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
31 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
CUP = Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. A. Hannay. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009. 
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6 See, e. g. Lippitt & Hutto 1998. But see also Ferreira 1994 for reasons to think that the austere 
view of nonsense may not be so alien to Kierkegaard. 
7 For a discussion of Climacus’ critique of Hegel on this score, see Watts 2007. 
8 Climacus often talks of ‘the aesthetic’ and ‘the intellectual’ in the same breath and he associates 
both with disinterestedness: ‘the aesthetic and the intellectual are disinterested’ (CUP: 266-267). 
While Climacus does not himself deploy the term ‘aesthetic-intellectual’, this term is coined in Either 
/ Or, where Kierkegaard’s Judge writes of the danger of letting himself be ‘carried away into the 
aesthetic-intellectual intoxication’ in which he says his young friend lives (KW IV: 16).   
9 Climacus defines ‘disinterestedness’ as ‘indifference to actuality’ and refers to ‘the disinterestedness 
of the intellectual’ (CUP: 267; 262). He further specifies the disinterested observer as one who is 
‘contemplatively outside himself’ and remarks that disinterestedness it is ‘the highest pathos’ in 
aesthetics (CUP: 328). 
10 As critics often observe, Socrates takes on a very different aspect in Postscript as compared with 
Fragments. As Mary-Jane Rubenstein puts it, ‘Socrates leaps … from Speculative Patriarch to Anti-
Systematic Hero somewhere between Fragments and Postscript’. (Rubenstein 2002: 350) See also n. 2 
above. 
11 On Kierkegaard’s early portrait of Socrates, as exemplifying a distinct kind of thinking and in 
dialogue with Hegel’s account of Socrates, see Watts 2010. 
12 On Socrates as a model of double-reflected inquiry, see Watts 2013: 438ff. 
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13 For a fine discussion of self-knowledge, in which the possibility of this sort of self-estrangement is 
to the fore, see Moran 2001.  
14 Recall in this connection Climacus’ ironical posture in Fragments, as noted above, of his being at a 
loss to explain what moved him to come up with his thought-experiment in the first place. 
15 The motif of keeping watch over boundaries, not least between the aesthetic-intellectual idea of 
(the loss of) immediacy and the ethico-religious idea of (the loss of) innocence, is central to The Concept of 
Anxiety and is even built into the name of the fictional author of this text: Vigilius Haufniensis, 
watchman of Copenhagen. See KW VIII: Ch. 1. 
16 See Burgess 2009: 270ff. 
17 This suggestion is anticipated by Stephen Mulhall, notwithstanding his official endorsement of 
what I have called the bullet-biting reading of Fragments. Mulhall writes: ‘We must therefore ask how 
Climacus’ intellectualized caricature of the god might nevertheless indirectly convey the true 
existential challenge embodied in Christian vision and terminology – might contain at least an echo 
of the voice of the god as it is reflected by the offended understanding’ (Mulhall 2001: 346).   
18 Compare also Robert Hopkins’ discussion of a caricature of Tony Blair: ‘if we are to see in the 
caricature Blair with an enormous mouth, it seems we must do two irreconcilable things. We must 
see Blair in it, so we must see it as resembling him in outline shape. But we must also see an 
enormous-mouthed thing in it, and to see it as resembling that in outline shape. Unfortunately these 
two things differ considerably in outline shape’ (Hopkins 1998: 96).  
19 For help with the ideas in this essay, I am grateful to my friends Joshua Furnal, Béatrice Han-Pile, 
David McNeil, Vasilis Politis and James Rodwell; also to the participants of the Durham Theology 
and Ethics Research Seminar at which I presented a version. 
